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On 13 August 2018, Lyudmyla Kozlovska, an Ukrainian national and the President of the
Open Dialog Foundation (ODF) in Poland, was detained following a passport control at the
Belgian airport in Brussels on the basis of a Polish entry ban reported into the Schengen
Information System (SIS II). One day later, the Belgian border authorities deported her to
Kiev, Ukraine. According to information provided on the website of the Open Dialog
Foundation, the entry ban on Kozlovska was included in the SIS II by the Polish authorities
on 31 July 2018. In accordance with Article 6 of the Schengen Borders Code, all other
Schengen States must on that basis consider her as an ‘inadmissible alien’ and refuse
entrance to the Schengen territory. This case raises questions on the discretionary power
of states to use the SIS II for entry bans on ‘unwanted migrants’ and the obligation of
executing states, in this case Belgium, to check the legitimacy or proportionality of these
other states decisions. Furthermore, this case illustrates the necessity of effective remedies
against decisions reported in large-scale databases such as SIS.
Limitations to the issuing of an entry ban in SIS
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According to Article 24 of the SIS II Regulation, a third-country national may be reported in
the SIS on two grounds: either his/her expulsion, refusal of entry or removal as a measure
of immigration law resulting into an entry ban on the basis of the (Return Directive
2008/115), or public order or security grounds. During her application for a EU long term
residence status, Kozlovska, for ten years a legal resident in Poland, was informed that she
was not reported into the SIS. When applying for access to her file of her application for a
long term status, this was refused on the ground that such disclosure would cause ‘serious
damage to the Republic of Poland’. This information indicates that she was not reported on
the basis of immigration grounds: in accordance with the Return Directive, if the Polish
authorities would have withdrawn her residence status, she should have been issued first a
return decision and return decisions are not automatically reported in the SIS II. Only if no
‘period of voluntary return’ has been granted a return decision will be followed by an entry
ban to be reported in the SIS.
A SIS alert on public order or security grounds can be based on either a conviction of an
offence by a Member State, punishable by a term of imprisonment of at least one year, or
when there are serious grounds for believing that he or she ‘has committed serious criminal
offences or concerning whom there are clear indications of an intention to commit such
offences on the territory of a Member State’.
These grounds, already included in the Schengen Convention of 1990, have been criticised
for providing a wide and disproportional basis for refusal of entry and expulsion. On the
basis of the first ground, a conviction for a minor crime in one of the Schengen States may
already result into a long-term banishment from the whole Schengen territory. Furthermore,
the second ground offers Schengen states a wide margin of appreciation of not only who is
to be considered as a risk of committing a serious crime, but also what is to be considered
a serious crime.
The power of states to issue a SIS alert is however restricted by two conditions, added in
the SIS II Regulation of 2006. First, every SIS entry ban must be based on an individual
assessment and second, before issuing an alert, Member States must determine whether
the case is ‘adequate, relevant, and important enough’ (Articles 21 and 24).  Any decision
to report a person as ‘inadmissible’ into the SIS is therefore bound by the purpose of the
SIS (to ‘ensure a high level of security within the area of freedom, security and justice of the
European Union, including the maintenance of public security and public policy and the
safeguarding of security in the territories of the Member States’) and the principle of
proportionality.
In Zh. and O,  addressing the question when on the basis of public order grounds, a
Member State may decide to provide no voluntary period of return on the basis of the
Return Directive, the CJEU held that while ‘Member States essentially retain the freedom to
determine the requirements of public policy in accordance with their national needs, which
can vary from one Member State to another and from one era to another’, these
requirements must be interpreted strictly ‘to ensure that the fundamental rights of third-
country nationals are respected when they are removed from the European Union’. The
CJEU applied the same criteria as with regard to EU citizens on the basis of the Citizenship
Directive, stating that the ‘risk to public policy’ must be based on a case-by-case basis in
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order to ascertain whether the personal conduct of the third-country national concerned
poses ‘a genuine and present risk to public policy’. Furthermore,  the principle of
proportionality and the fundamental rights of the person at stake must be taken into
account (para. 50, 69).
Considering the protection of fundamental rights, in the case of Mrs Kozlovska who has a
family in Poland and is married to a Polish citizen, the entry ban affected both her right to
family life (8 ECHR, 7 EU Charter) and her right to freedom of expression (10 ECHR, 9 EU
Charter). In Piermont, dealing with Article 10 ECHR and a French measure of expulsion
from French Polynesia and a prohibition on re-entry to New Caledonia against a German
member of the European Parliament, the ECtHR found that Article 10 ECHR was violated
because the French authorities did not strike a fair balance ‘between, on the one hand, the
public interest requiring the prevention of disorder and the upholding of territorial integrity
and, on the other, [the applicant’s] freedom of expression”.'
It seems unlikely that Poland could invoke Article 16 ECHR according to which Articles 10,
11 (freedom of religion) and 14 (non-discrimination) does not prevent States ‘to limit the
political activities of aliens’. The ECtHR has never found any justification for the use of this
exception, nor for any differentiated treatment between nationals and non-nationals with
regard to the protection of the freedom of expression. In Perinçek, para 121-123, the
ECtHR underlined that the clause in Article 16 should be interpreted restrictively and
'construed as only capable of authorising restrictions on 'activities that directly affect the
political process'.  According to the ECtHR, since the right to freedom of expression
was guaranteed by 10 ECHR 'regardless of frontiers', no distinction could be drawn
between its exercise by nationals and foreigners.
Role of the executing state
Aside from questions on the legitimacy of the Polish entry ban, the lawfulness of the
Belgian decision to enforce the SIS alert by expelling Mrs Kozlovska to Kiev can be
questioned as well. Although SIS II is implicitly based on the principle of mutual trust and
requires Schengen States to enforce each other’s SIS alerts, a state may have a duty to
check their lawfulness or proportionality, if its enforcement would violate fundamental rights
of the person at stake.
This has been affirmed by the CJEU on the use of the Dublin system for the transfer of
asylum seekers in NS v SSDH, with regard to the execution of the European Arrest
Warrant (EAW) in Aranyosi and Căldăraru and more recently in the important Celmer case
dealing with the independency of national courts in Poland. In Aranyosi and Căldăraru, the
case concerned the treatment of imprisoned persons in the executing state and the
question whether extradition would not violate their absolute right of protection against
inhuman or degrading treatment (3 ECHR and 4 of the EU Charter).
The Celmer judgment dealt with the doubts of the Irish court on whether Polish nationals to
be surrendered on the basis of a EAW would receive a fair trial in accordance with Article
47 of the Charter, considering the recent changes in the Polish judicial system. The CJEU
held that a judicial authority called to execute a EAW must refrain to give effect to it, if first,
it would find ‘a real risk of breach of the essence of the fundamental right to a fair trial on
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account of systemic or generalised deficiencies concerning the judiciary, and second, if
considering the specific circumstances of the case it would find substantial grounds to
believe the requested person would run that risk (para. 68). Only when on the basis of
Article 7(2) TEU, the European Council  would have determined a breach of the principles
of Article 2 TEU in  a Member State, national courts should, according to the CJEU, refuse
the execution of EAW of that state automatically (70-74). Although, see the comments of
Van Ballegooij/Bárd, this seems to be a high threshold for national courts to rebut trust, it is
important that the CJEU underlines the duty to investigate and assess independency and
impartiality of courts before extradition. Where the aforementioned cases dealt with the
expulsion or extradition from one Member State to another Member State, in Commission v
Spain, the CJEU specifically dealt with SIS-alerts for the refusal of entrance on third-
country national spouses of EU citizens. In this judgment, the CJEU found that the refusal
of a visa or entry to a third-country national, which is solely based on a SIS alert without
checking whether he or she presents a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat, is in
violation of  the rights of  family members of EU citizens on the basis of EU law.
Therefore, it seems arguable to claim that before expelling Mrs Kozlovska to Kiev, the
Belgian authorities should have checked first whether this expulsion would not violate her
rights to freedom of expression, family life, or effective judicial protection, but certainly her
right to residence as a family member of a EU citizen.
Access to legal remedies
Third-country nationals reported into SIS II on the basis of public order and security reasons
will generally only be informed about the existence of this report when confronted with a
refusal of visa or entry, (extension of) a residence permit, or as in this case, deportation.
This makes it difficult to challenge SIS alerts in time. However, on the basis of Article 43
SIS II Regulation, a person may bring an action before the courts or the authority
competent under the law of ‘any Member State’ to access, correct, delete or obtain
information or to obtain compensation in connection with an alert relating to him or her.
Furthermore, it provides that Member States must undertake mutually to enforce final
decisions handed down by these courts or authorities. This means that persons reported in
SIS II can start legal proceedings in any of the Schengen states and if subsequently a
national court or authority in that state decides the entry ban is unlawful, the reporting state
must delete the entry ban from SIS II. This provision therefore offers an important basis for
starting legal remedies against SIS entry bans, specifically when in the reporting states no
effective remedies against SIS alerts are available, as seems the case in Poland according
to information of the Helsinki Foundation.
Final remarks
SIS II is currently used by 22 EU Member States plus the four Schengen Associate
countries, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland,  and Liechtenstein. Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia,
and the UK operate SIS only for the purpose of law enforcement cooperation, while Cyprus
and Ireland are not connected to the SIS yet. According to the statistics provided by the
responsible EU Agency euLISA, SIS II held in 2017 501.996 alerts on third-country
nationals for the purpose of refusal of stay/entry, which is 56% of all the data on individuals
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in SIS II (which also may include persons issued with a EAW, missing persons, persons to
assist in a judicial procedure, and persons entered ‘for discreet and specific checks’).
Although, as mentioned above, the CJEU and the ECtHR provided relevant criteria
protecting individual’s rights, further clarification on the powers and obligations of the
Schengen states when using SIS remains necessary. Not only because of the increasing
and interlinked use of EU large-scale databases for migration and security purposes, but
also considering recent national developments, affecting EU principles of the rule of law
and democracy.
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